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1 Introduction
The systematic risk and contagion play a crucial role in the financial cri-
sis. Many recent researches have put attention on this object since the Asian
banking crisis of the late 90s, and the more recent banking crisis of 2007-2008.
Most of them used directed graphs (network) to model interdependencies of
system finance. For example, in Elliott et al. (2014), values of organizations
depend on each other - e.g., through cross-holdings of shares, debt, or other
liabilities. By tracking how asset values and failure costs propagate through
the network of interdependencies as domino effect, the authors show how
the probability of cascades and their extent depend on two key aspects of
cross-holdings: integration and diversification. Rogers & Veraart (2013) is
interested in the role of linkage in interbank and provide condition when res-
cue consortia exists. In order to study the importance of institutions, one can
use the Contagion Index Cont et al. (2010), CDS spreads or equity volatil-
ity Acharya et al. (2017), Huang et al. (2009)... On the contrary, the global
level of systemic risk in the entire network can be considered by many other
authors. References on the global level is referred to Cont et al. (2010) for
a short survey. In another approach, Acemoglu et al. (2015) is interested in
the stability and resilience of the financial system under effecting of negative
shocks. Fouque & Sun (2013) focuses on the number of components reaching
a default level in a given time. The authors used the mean-field limit and
a large deviation estimate for a simple linear model of lending and borrow-
ing banks to illustrate systematic risk. The mean-field limit is also used in
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Chong & Klu¨ppelberg (2015) to prove a law of large numbers. Both articles
investigate system of interacting stochastic differential equations.
The present paper introduces a structural framework to model dependent
defaults, with a particular interest in their contagion. The idea is based on
the modeling of dependent stochastic intensities in Jarrow & Yu (2001). By
“structural”, we mean, as usual in the context, modeling bankruptcy or
default of a contingent claim by an event that a firm value process reaches a
level. The level can be either endogenous as the seminal paper Leland & Toft
(1996), but at this stage it is given exogenously. Since we are concerned with
mutual dependence of the default, we consider a vector valued process, each
component of which is the value of a firm. In our model, to describe the
contagion, the default level of each firm is assumed to be affected every time
a default of another firm occurs. Such kind of model has also been studied in
Chong & Klu¨ppelberg (2016). In their paper Chong & Klu¨ppelberg (2016),
the authors use the Bayesian network methodology to characterize the joint
default distribution of the financial system at a given maturity.
In our model, a default of a firm brings about a prescribed constant jump
to the default level of other firms. One default can therefore cause other
defaults, but each of the second order default may trigger third order ones,
and so on. This gives a structural framework to Bayesian network type
dependence of joint default probability.
Another difference is that Chong & Klu¨ppelberg (2016) only considers
the firms value at maturity time. The default or survive of a company is
determined by its equity. It is different from our approach. We are not only
interested in the number of default at given time but also in default time and
number of default at default time. They depend on the state of firms value
which hits some special zone, called contagion region.
2 Model
The model used in the present paper is similar to the one in Chong & Klu¨ppelberg
(2016). Let X it denote the firm value process of the i-th company, for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n with n ≥ 2. Define “default time” by
τ i := inf{s ≥ 0 : X is ≤ K
i},
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where ki ∈ R is a exogenously given default level for the i-th company. We
assume that X ≡ (X1, · · · , Xn) solves the following equation;
X it = x
i −
∑
j 6=i
Ci,j1{τ j<t∧τ i} +
∫ t∧τ i
0
(σi(X
i
s)dW
i + µi(X is) dt)
+
∑
j 6=i
∫ t∧τ i
t∧τ j∧τ i
(σji (X
i
s)dW
i + µji (Xs) dt)
(1)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, where W i, i = 1, · · · , n are independent Brownian mo-
tions, and for i, j = 1, · · · , n, Ci,j are non-negative constants, σi, µi, σ
j
i , µ
j
i ,
each defined on Rn, are smooth function with at most linear growth.
In a more concise way of saying,
• each component is a diffusion process, independent to each other, for
each interval from a default time to next one,
• the default of i-th company brings about a jump Cij to j-th company,
• which may causes the default of j-th company.
• The i-th default may also affects the dynamics of the j-th firm value
process in terms of its growth rate or the volatility.
Define the first contagion time by
τ(1) := min{τi : i = 1, · · · , n},
with the convention that, min ∅ = ∞. The j-th contagion time is defined
recursively by
τ(j) := min{τk : τk > τ(j − 1)}, j = 2, 3, · · · , n
∗,
where n∗ is the random variable so defined that at n∗-the contagion time all
the companies left default. Note that n∗ ≤ n but each of τ(j) can be infinity.
To price credit derivatives such as CDO or CDS, the distribution of the
number of defaulted companies by a fixed time, denoted by Nt, and the joint
distribution of τi, i ∈ I0 ⊂ {1, · · · , n} are required.
These are in principle obtained from the joint distribution of
(τ(1), · · · , τ(n), d(τ(1)), · · · , d(τ(n))),
where
d(τ(k)) = {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : τi = τ(k)}, k = 1, · · · , n
∗.
3
3 General Case
3.1 Key Ideas
The first key idea is that we regard (τ(i), Xτ(i)) as (something like) a “renewal-
reward” process. We shall have a formula of the joint density of
(d(τ(1)), τ(1), Xτ(1))
conditioned by the starting pointX0. Here we understand Xτ(1)+t, t ≥ 0 to be
an Rd(τ(1))
c
-valued process; we are only interested in the survived companies.
Then, by replacing {1, · · · , n} with d(τ(1))c and X0 with Xτ(1), we obtain
the joint distribution of
(d(τ(2)), τ(2), Xτ(2))
conditioned by Xτ(1), thanks to Markov property of X . We can repeat this
procedure to get the desired joint distribution.
We can separate the problem of determining the joint distribution of
(d(τ(1)), τ(1), Xτ(1)) into three parts.
• We pretend that we are given the harmonic measure of Xτ(1)− (before
the “artificial” jumps): in a simple Brownian case it is known.
• Then the problem reduces to the description of “contagion domain”,
but it may not be in the form of disjoint union.
• To get a computable form, we rely on the independence and a recursive
equation.
To take into account that we work on a “renewal” setting described as
above, from now on we let the index set of X be arbitrary finite subset. In
order to specify the initial index set, we put superscript I to the previously
defined notations; τ I(1), dI , and so on. We then concentrate on the study of
the joint distribution of
(dI(τ I(1)), τ I(1), X
I\J
τI(1)
). (2)
3.2 Contagion domain
Let I := {i1, · · · , i♯I} and for a permutation σ ∈ SI over I, we put
DI,σ :={
(xi1 , · · · , xi♯I ) ∈ R
I : xiσ(1) = K
iσ(1) , xiσ(2) ∈ (K
iσ(2), Kiσ(2) + Ciσ(1),iσ(2)],
· · · , xiσ(♯I) ∈ (K
iσ(♯I), Kiσ(♯I) +
♯I−1∑
j=1
Ciσ(j),iσ(♯I)]
}
.
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Then, we have the following
Lemma 1 For ∅ 6= J ⊂ I, we have that
{dI(τ I(1)) = J}
=

XIτI (1)− = (XJτI(1)−, XI\JτI(1)−) ∈
⋃
σ∈SJ
DJ,σ ×
∏
i∈I\J
(Ki +
∑
j∈J
Cj,i,∞)

 .
Proof. The relation is clear if one sees that dI(τ I(1)) = J := {j1, · · · , jm}
is equivalent to the following: there is a permutation σ ∈ SJ such that
(i) Xj
σ(1) hits K
jσ(1),
(ii) at the hitting time Xjσ(2) is in the interval (Kjσ(2), Kjσ(2) +Cjσ(1),jσ(2)] so
that the jσ(1)-th company’s default caused jσ(2)-th company,
(iii) Xjσ(3) is in the interval (Kjσ(3), Kjσ(2) + Cjσ(1),jσ(3) + Cjσ(2),jσ(3)] so that
jσ(3)-th company defaulted due to jσ(1) and/or jσ(2)-th company’s de-
fault,
...
(m) Xjσ(m) ∈ (Kjσ(m), Kjσ(m) +
∑m−1
l=1 Cjσ(l),iσ(m)],
and (m+1) for i ∈ I \ J , X i ∈ (Ki+
∑
j∈J Cj,i,∞) so that the default of the
companies indexed by J did not cause the default of i-th company.
We put
DII :=
⋃
σ∈SI
DI,σ,
and for non-empty J ( I, we put
DIJ := D
J
J × A
I
J ,
where
AIJ :=
∏
i∈I\J
(Ki +
∑
j∈J
Cj,i,∞). (3)
Lemma 2 DIJ ∩D
I
J ′ = ∅ if J 6= J
′.
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Proof. We may assume without loss of generality, J \ J ′ is non-empty. Let
J \ J ′ = {k1, · · · , kl} and J ∩ J
′ = {kl+1, · · · , k♯J}. Then, for x ∈ D
I
J , there
is a permutation σ ∈ SJ such that
(xk1, · · · , xkl)
∈ (Kk1 , Kk1 +
∑
j:σ−1(j)<σ−1(1)
Ckj ,k1]× · · · × (K
kl, Kkl +
∑
j:σ−1(j)<σ−1(l)
Ckj ,kl],
(4)
where if σ(i) = 1, the sum is set to be zero. On the other hand, for x =
(xi1 , · · · , xi♯I ) ∈ D
I
J ′ , it holds that
(xk1 , · · · , xkl) ∈ (K
k1 +
∑
j∈J ′
Cj,k1,∞)× · · · × (K
kl +
∑
j∈J ′
Cj,kl,∞) (5)
since {k1, · · · , kl} ⊂ I \ J
′.
Let
j∗ := argmin
j∈J
σ−1(j).
Then
σ−1(j) < σ−1(j∗)
implies j ∈ J ′ ∩ J and therefore
{j : σ−1(j) < σ−1(j∗)} ⊂ J
′.
Now we see that (4) and (5) are not compatible, meaning that DIJ ∩ D
I
J ′ is
empty.
Further, we set
DI :=
⋃
i∈I
{Ki} ×
∏
j 6=i
(Kj,∞).
Then we have the following
Lemma 3 Let J1, · · · , Jk be such that ∅ 6= Jk ( · · · ( J1, and set
HJ1,··· ,Jk := D
Jk × A
Jk−1
Jk
× · · · ×AJ1J2 .
Then it holds that
DII = HI \⊎∅6=J1(I(HI,J1 \⊎∅6=J2(J1(HI,J1,J2 \⊎∅6=J3(J2(HI,J1,J2,J3 \ · · · ))) (6)
so that for any measure µ on B(DI),
µ(DII ) = µ(HI) +
∑
∅6=J1(I
(−1)µ(HI,J1) +
∑
J1(I
∑
∅6=J2(J1
(−1)2µ(HI,J1,J2)
+ · · ·+
∑
J1(I
· · ·
∑
∅6=J♯I−1(J♯I−2
(−1)♯I−1µ(HI,J1,··· ,J♯I−1).
(7)
6
Proof. We first prove
DI = ∪J⊆ID
I
J . (8)
That DI includes the right-hand-side is clear. Suppose that x ∈ DI . Then,
xi = Ki for a unique i and xj > Kj for j 6= i. If there exits j 6= i such
that xj ≤ Kj +Ci,j, we rename it as j1. Otherwise, (xj)j∈I\{i} ∈ A
I
{i} and so
x ∈ DI{i}. Among I \{i, j1}, if we could find j such that xj ≤ K
j+Ci,j+Cj1,j,
we rename it j2. Otherwise x ∈ D
I
{i,j1}
. This procedure can be repeated at
most ♯I − 1 times when we have x ∈ DII . So in any case x ∈ ∪J⊆ID
I
J .
Next, observe that
DII = D
I \ ⊎J1(ID
I
J1
= DI \ ⊎J1(I(D
J1
J1
×AIJ1)
by (8) and Lemma 2. By applying (8) to DJ1J1 , and by Lemma 2 we obtain
that
DII = D
I \ ⊎J1(I
(
(DJ1 × AIJ1) \ ⊎J2(J1(D
J2
J2
× AJ1J2)× A
I
J1
)
.
By applying (8) to DJ2J2 and Lemma 2, and so on, we finally reach (6).
3.3 The first main result
Let ∅ 6= J ( I, and define a family of measures
hIJ(x,A, S) := P (d
I(τ I(1)) = J,X
I\J
τI(1)
∈ A, τ I(1) ∈ S|XI0 = x),
hI(x, S) = P (dI(τ I(1)) = I, τ(1) ∈ S|XI0 = x),
and
QI(x,A, S) = P (XIτI(1)− ∈ A, τ
I(1) ∈ S|XI0 = x)
for x ∈
∏
i∈I(K
i,∞), A ∈ B(DI) and S ∈ B[0,∞). The last one is the
harmonic measure of the process XI on the boundary ∂
∏
i∈I(K
i,∞) = DI .
Our first main result relates the joint distribution of (dI(τ I(1)), τ I(1), X
I\J
τI(1)
)
to the harmonic measure Q.
Theorem 4 We have that
hIJ(x,A, S) = Q
I(x,DJJ × s
I
J(A), S) (9)
and
hI(x, S) = QI(x,DII , S). (10)
Here sIJ is a shift on R
I\J defined by
sIJ((x
i, i ∈ I \ J)) = ((xi +
∑
j∈J
Cj,i)). (11)
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Proof. The formula (9) is almost clear from Lemma 1 since we have
{dI(τ I(1)) = J,X
I\J
τI(1)
∈ A, τ I(1) ∈ S}
=
{
XIτI(1)− ∈
⋃
σ∈SJ
DJ,σ × s
I
J(A)
}
∩ {τ I(1) ∈ S}
for S ∈ B(0,∞). The formula (10) is also clear from Lemma 1.
4 Joint Distribution of Contagions and For-
mulas for Contagion Probabilities
In this section, we are interested in the distribution of the number of defaulted
companies by a fixed time, denoted by Nt, and the distribution of the default
time of some specific firm. These distributions are useful for pricing of credit
derivatives like CDO or CDS.
Denote
Ij := I \
j⊎
l=1
d(τ I(l)) = Ij−1 \ d(τ
I(j))
the random set of indices of the firms that survived after the j-th contagion
time τ I(j), for j = 1, 2, · · · , ♯I. Let U1 = τ
I(1), U2 = τ
I(2)− τ I(1), ..., Uk =
τ I(k)− τ I(k − 1)... be inter-arrival times between consecutive defaults. We
let Ui =∞ if τ(i) =∞.
Thanks to the Markov property of the firm value evolution we get the
following (X Ij , τ(j), Ij).
Theorem 5 Let Jj ⊂ Ij−1 be a non-empty set, Aj ∈ B(
∏
i∈Ij
[Ki,∞)), and
Sj ∈ B([0,∞)), for j = 1, 2, · · · , n
∗. (i) We have the “renewal Markov
property”: for m = 1, · · · , n∗,
P
(
X Im
τJ (m)
∈ Am, d(τ
I(m)) = Jm, τ
I(m) ∈ Sm | {X
Ij
τI(j)
, Ij, τ
I(j); j < m}
)
=P
(
X Im
τI(m)
∈ Am, d(τ
I(m)) = Jm, τ
I(m) ∈ Sm | X
Im−1
τI(m−1)
, Im−1, τ
I(m− 1)
)
,
and (ii) the transition probability is described by the harmonic measure as
P
(
X Im
τI(m)
∈ Am, d(τ(m)) = Jm, τ
I(m) ∈ Sm|X
Im−1
τI(m−1)
, Im−1, τ
I(m− 1)
)
= h
Im−1
Jm
(X
Im−1
τI(m−1)
, Am, Sm − τ
I(m− 1))
= QIm−1(X
Im−1
τI(m−1)
, DJmJm × s
Im−1
Jm
(Am), Sm − τ
I(m− 1))).
8
(iii) Consequently, we have that
P
(
{X
Ij
τI(j)
∈ Aj , d(τ
I(j)) = Jj, Uj ∈ Sj ; j ≤ m} | X
I
0 = x
I
)
=
∫
A1×···×Am
m∏
j=1
h
Ij−1
Jj
(
x
Ij−1
j−1 , dx
Ij
j , Sj
)
=
∫
∏m
j=1 s
Ij−1
Jj
(Aj)
m∏
j=1
QIj−1
(
(s
Ij−2
Jj−1
)−1(x
Ij−2\Jj−1=Ij−1
j−1 ), D
Jj
Jj
× dx
Ij−1\Jj=Ij
j , Sj
)
,
where
I0 = I, Ij := I \
j⊎
l=1
Jl, j = 1, 2, · · · , m ≤ n
∗,
and sI∗J∗∗ is the shift defined in the previous section as (11), with the conven-
tion that s
I−1
∗ is the identity map.
Proof. The first assertion (i) is clear from the Markov property of X . The
second one is also a direct consequence of the time-homogeneous property
and Theorem 4. The third one is obtained by combining (ii) and the renewal
Markov property (i).
As a consequence, we can get the “marginal distribution” concerning on
inter-arrival time between two consecutive defaults and the set of the next
default index.
Corollary 6 For J1, · · · , Jm ⊂ I with ∅ 6= J
c
m ( · · · ( J
c
1, and S1, · · ·Sm ∈
B([0,∞)),
P ({Uj ∈ Sj , d(τ
I(j)) = Jj; j ≤ m})
=
m∏
j=1
∫
A
Ij−1
Jj
QIj−1
(
(s
Ij−2
Jj−1
)−1(xj−1), D
Jj
Jj
× dxj, Sj
)
,
where AI∗J∗∗ is the set defined in the previous section as (3).
Corollary 6 is an important key to find out some important distributions
such as the number of defaulted firms given a fixed time, the time to default
of a given firm, or the time to the m-th default. The following proposition
provides the distribution for the number of defaulted firms given a fixed time.
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Proposition 7 For k = 1, ..., n, we have
P (Nt = k | X
I
0 = x
I
0)
=
k∑
m=1
∑
♯
⊎
p≤m Jp=k
∫
u1+···+um≤t
u1+···+um+1>t
m∏
j=1∫
A
I\⊎
j−1
l=1
Jl
Jj
QI\⊎
j−1
l=1 Jl
(
(s
I\⊎j−2l=1 Jl
Jj−1
)−1(xj−1), D
Jj
Jj
× dxj, duj
)
.
Proof. Since the event {Nt = k} can be expressed as
⊎k
m=1{τ
I(m) ≤ t <
τ I(m+ 1),#(I \ Im) =
∑m
p=1#d(τ
I(p)) = k}, we have that
P (Nt = k | X
I
0 = x
I
0)
=
k∑
m=1
P
(
τ I(m) ≤ t < τ I(m+ 1),
m∑
p=1
#d(τ I(p)) = k | XI0 = x
I
0
)
=
k∑
m=1
∑
♯
⊎
p≤m Jp=k
P (
m∑
j=1
Uj ≤ t <
m+1∑
j=1
Uj , d(τ
I(p)) = Jp, p ≤ m | X
I
0 = x
I
0).
(12)
By applying Corollary 6, we have that
(the summand of (12))
=
∫
u1+···+um≤t
u1+···+um+1>t
m∏
j=1
∫
A
I\⊎
j−1
l=1
Jl
Jj
QI\⊎
j−1
l=1 Jl
(
(s
I\⊎j−2
l=1 Jl
Jj−1
)−1(xj−1), D
Jj
Jj
× dxj , duj
)
.
We can also obtain the distribution function of the m-th contagion time.
Proposition 8 For m = 1, ..., n, we have
P (τ(m)) > t | XI0 = x
I
0)
=
m−1∑
k=1
∑
#⊎k−1i=1 Ii<n
∫
u1+···+um≤t
u1+···+um+1>t
m∏
j=1
∫
A
I\⊎
j−1
l=1
Jl
Jj
QI\⊎
j−1
l=1 Jl
(
(s
I\⊎j−2l=1 Jl
Jj−1
)−1(xj−1), D
Jj
Jj
× dxj , duj
)
.
(13)
10
Proof. We have
P (τ I(k) > t | XI0 = x
I
0)
=
k∑
m=1
P (τ I(m− 1) ≤ t < τ I(m) | XI0 = x
I
0)
=
k∑
m=1
∑
#
⊎
Jp<n
P (τ I(m− 1) ≤ t < τ I(m), d(τ I(p)) = Jp, p ≤ m | X
I
0 = x
I
0).
Using the same technique as we did for Proposition 7, we obtain the formula
13.
The k-th company survives up to time t if and only if the index k is always
out of all the default set d(τ I(p)) up to time t. Hence we can get survival
probability of a set of firms as
Proposition 9 Let K ⊂ I be a non-empty set. Then we have that
P (τk > t, k ∈ K | X
I
0 = x
I
0)
=
n−♯K∑
m=0
∑
⊎pl=1Jl∩K=∅
∫
u1+···+um≤t
u1+···+um+1>t
m∏
j=1
∫
A
I\⊎
j−1
l=1
Jl
Jj
QI\⊎
j−1
l=1 Jl
(
(s
I\⊎j−2l=1 Jl
Jj−1
)−1(xj−1), D
Jj
Jj
× dxj , duj
)
.
Proof. The formula can be obtained in a similar way as the previous propo-
sitions by noting
P (τk > t, k ∈ K | X
I
0 = x
I
0)
=
n−♯K∑
m=0
∑
⊎p
l=1Jl∩K=∅
P (τ I(m) ≤ t < τ I(m+ 1), d(τ I(p)) = Jp, p ≤ m | X
I
0 = x
I
0),
where we understand J0 = ∅ when m = 0.
5 Models with Independence
5.1 The “harmonic measure”
As we have seen, the joint distributions we need is obtained from the “har-
monic measure” QI . In this section we impose independence among X i.
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Then the it is in fact expressed in terms of the harmonic measures of X i to
[Ki,∞), i ∈ I.
Let us be more precise. Let X˜ be a kind of Business As Usual process
given as
X˜ it = x
i +
∫ t
0
(σi(X˜
i
s)dW
i + µi(X˜ is) dt),
and τ˜i be its default time:
τ˜i := inf{s > 0 : X˜
i
s ≤ K
i}.
We assume that each of the distribution of (τ˜i, X˜
i) has a density, and put
pj(x
i, s) =
P (τ˜i ∈ ds|X˜
i = xi)
ds
,
and
qi(x
i, yi, s) =
P (τ˜i > s, X˜
i
s ∈ dyi|X˜
i = xi)
dyi
,
for xi, yi ∈ [Ki,∞) and s > 0.
The “harmonic measure”, the distribution of of XIτ(1) can be obtained by
the following
Lemma 10 For A ∈ B(G) and S ∈ B(0,∞),
Q(x,A, S) =
∫
S
∑
i
pi(x
i, s)ds
∫
A
δKi(dyi)
∏
j 6=i
qj(x
j , yj, s)dyj, (14)
where δ∗ is the Dirac delta at ∗.
Proof. The left-hand-side of (14)
=
∫
S
∑
i
P ({τ˜i ∈ ds} ∩j 6=i {τ˜
i < τ˜ j , X˜τ˜j ∈ A})
=
∫
S
∑
i
∫
A
δKi(dyi)P (τ˜
i ∈ ds, s < τ j , X˜js ∈ dyj, ∀j 6= i).
By the independence of X˜ i, i ∈ I, we have the desired relation (14).
We put
gIJ(x
I\J , A, s) :=
∫
∏
i∈I\J [K
i,∞)∩A
∏
i∈I\J
qi(x
i, yi +
∑
j∈J
Cj,i, s) dyi,
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and
gJI (x
I\J , s) := gIJ(x
I\J ,RI\J , s)
=
∫
AI
J
∏
i∈I\J
qi(x
i, yi, s) dyi
for s > 0 and A ∈ B(RI\J).
Since here hI have a density, we will write, with a slight abuse of the
notations,
hI(xI , s) = hI(xI , ds)/ds ≡ P (dI(τ I(1)) = I, τ I(1) ∈ ds|XI0 = x
I)/ds, s > 0.
Theorem 11 (i) For a non-empty J ( I, S ∈ B(0,∞), and A ∈ B(RI\J),
hIJ(x = x
I , A, S) =
∫
S
hJ(xJ , s)gIJ(s, x
I\J , A)ds. (15)
(ii) For s > 0,
hI(x = xI , s)
=
(∑
i∈I
pi(x
i, s)
)(
1 +
♯I−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
Im(...(I1(I0:=I
m∏
l=1
g
Il−1
Il
(xIl−1\Il, s)
)
.
(16)
Proof. (i) It suffices to show when A =
∏
i∈I\J(ai, bi). By combining (9)
and Lemma 10, we see that
hIJ(S,
∏
i∈I\J
(ai, bi))
=
∫
S
∑
i∈J
pi(s)
∫
DJJ
δKi(dxi)
∏
j∈J\{i}
qj(s, xj) dxj
×
∏
i∈I\J
∫
(ai+
∑
j∈J Cj,i,bi+
∑
j∈J Cj,i)∩(K
i+
∑
j∈J Cj,i,∞)
qi(s, xi)dxi
=
∫
S
hJ(s)
∫
∏
i∈I\J [K
i,∞)∩(ai,bi)
∏
i∈I\J
qi(s, xi −
∑
j∈J
Cj,i)dxds.
Thus we obtained (15).
(ii) The equation (16) is a direct consequence of (10) in Theorem 4 and
(7) in Lemma 3, together with the relation
gIJ(s, x = x
I\J ) =
∫
AIJ
∏
i∈I\J
qi(s, x
i, yi) dyi.
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